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Abstract
Background: Meta-analyses show that hospital rapid response systems (RRS) are associated with reduced rates of cardiorespiratory arrest and
mortality. However, many RRS fail to provide appropriate outcomes. Thus an improved understanding of how to succeed with a RRS is crucial. By
understanding the barriers and facilitators within the limbs of a RRS, these can be addressed.
Objective: To explore the barriers and facilitators within the limbs of a RRS as described by health-care professionals working within the system.
Methods: The electronic databases searched were: EMBASE, MEDLINE, CINAHL, Epistemonikos, Cochrane, PsychInfo and Web of Science. Search
terms were related to RRS and their facilitators and barriers. Studies were appraised guided by the CASP tool. Twenty-one qualitative studies were
identified and subjected to content analysis.
Results: Clear leadership, interprofessional trust and collaboration seems to be crucial for succeeding with a RRS. Clear protocols, feedback,
continuous evaluation and interprofessional training were highlighted as facilitators. Reprimanding down the hierarchy, underestimating the importance
of call-criteria, alarm fatigue and a lack of integration with other hospital systems were identified as barriers.
Conclusion: To succeed with a RRS, the keys seem to lie in the administrative and quality improvement limbs. Clear leadership and continuous quality
improvement provide the foundation for the continuing collaboration to manage deteriorating patients. Succeeding with a RRS is a never-ending
process.
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Introduction
The implementation of rapid response systems (RRS) to improve
patient safety is strongly supported by quality improvement organiza-
tions such as the Institute of Healthcare Improvement,1 and is
recommended in international guidelines.24 A successful RRS may
be defined as a hospital-wide system that ensures observations,
detection of deterioration, and tailored response to ward patients.5,6
Time is essential, as delayed management has been associated with
increase mortality.7,8
Two previous systematic reviews5,9 have found moderate-strength
evidence that implementation of RRS is associated with reduced rates
of cardiac arrest and mortality. However, because many RRS fail to
provide appropriate outcomes, there is debate about their effective-
ness, and how to evaluate them.1013 Studies focusing primarily on
outcomes often have limited assessment of the context, processes or
mechanisms leading to those outcomes, and thus provide limited
explanations of why RRS work or do not work in clinical practice.14
There is general consensus about what constitutes an RRS (Fig. 1),
but great variation in how RRS components are constituted and
operate.9
This highlights the need to identify the factors that contribute to their
effectiveness in different operational contexts. If the RRS is not used as
intended, expecting results is futile. Even if a hospital has officially
implemented an RRS, compliance with the system may be low.13,15
Cultural barriers may persist,5 and understanding these is highlighted
as essential.16
To improve our current understanding of the factors affecting the
RRS we performed a systematic review based on the following
question: “How do healthcare professionals perceive potential
facilitators and barriers within the limbs of a RRS?”
Methods
The present systematic review was conducted according to the
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses (PRISMA) statement.18 A broad search strategy was used
to ensure inclusion of all relevant papers.
Search protocol and eligibility criteria
In October 2017 we systematically searched EMBASE, MEDLINE,
CINAHL, Epistemonikos, Cochrane, PsychInfo, and Web of Science,
for the period 20002017 and updated the search on March 20, 2019.
The search terms used were: “rapid response team”, “medical
emergency team”, “critical care outreach team”, “evaluate”, “imple-
ment”, “utilize”, “adopt”, “success”, “fail”, and “barrier” (Appendix 1).
An expert librarian assisted with this search.
Inclusion criteria
 Papers published from January 1, 2010March 20, 2019.
 Original research
 Peer reviewed
Fig. 1 – The structure of a Rapid response system (RRS), adapted from the findings of the first Consensus Conference of
Medical Emergency Teams.17
The four limbs of the RRS6:
The afferent limb: the systematic process of monitoring patients and detect deterioration supported by predefined
criteria.
The efferent limb: the response team with expertice in handling deteriorating patients. The team configuration most
commonly used: Medical Emergency Teams (MET), often led by a physician from the ICU, Rapid Response Teams
(RRT), in Australia used synonymous with MET, but in US often led by nurses. Critical Care Outreach Teams (CCO) most
commonly used in UK, often staffed by ICU nurses.
The administrative limb: oversees the system. Ensure personnel and equipment resources, training and education.
The quality improvement limb: collect and report data, provide feedback and thereby improve the system.
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 All study designs
 Languages: English, Norwegian, Swedish and Danish.
 RRS with at least an afferent and an efferent limb.
Exclusion criteria
 In consensus it was decided to exclude articles published before
2010, to focus on the newest publications.
 Articles on paediatric RRS and subgroups (example: pulmonary
embolism RRT’s, obstetric RRT’s).
Study selection
We performed an initial screen of publications (3024) to remove
duplicates, then read all titles and abstracts; full-text articles were
retrieved if they appeared to meet the inclusion criteria and addressed
the predefined review question. The full-text was also retrieved if the
title and abstract gave insufficient information to allow immediate
exclusion. Four papers used multiple designs, and only the qualitative
component addressing the review question was included1922
(Fig. 2).
Data extraction
The data extraction process involved familiarization with and
comparison of the included studies. The papers that addressed our
research question used a qualitative approach, so we performed a
qualitative content analysis23 (Table 3). The findings were organized
according to the four limbs of the RRS model (Fig. 1)
Quality and risk of bias
Study quality and risk of bias were evaluated using the Critical
Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) tool24 (Table 1). Two papers
were excluded because of low quality.
Fig. 2 – PRISMA flow chart.
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Table 1 – Critical appraisal: critical appraisal skills programe (CASP) tool.
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We included 21 qualitative papers in the final review (Table 2).
Different terms used to describe the efferent limb were standardised in
this review as RRT.
Categories and themes that emerged in the analysis are presented
in Table 3. Findings connected to the efferent limb were intertwined
with the afferent limb, thus presented under the headline ‘The
connection of the Afferent and Efferent limb’. Key findings are
presented in Table 4.
Administrative and quality improvement limbs
The barrier of disconnected leadership and vague lines of
responsibility
The influence of leadership and vision
Organizational leadership support14,25,26 and having a mission-
driven organization25 were described as essential: “ People who work
in this hospital are really aware of our mission and they are committed
to care for our patients and to our purpose” .25 Conversely, poor
governance associated with a lack of protocols or equipment, poor
logistics and lack of commitment by senior staff and management
were viewed as barriers.27
Unclear protocols with lack of integration in handover processes
Confusion around when to call the RRT and their optimal
response2633 was a frequently reported barrier. By contrast, clear
call-criteria, including the expectation that when in doubt, a call should
be made, was described as a facilitator.29 Normalization of breaches
of RRS-protocol during busy periods were percieved to undermine the
system.34,35
Cooperation and patient flow were facilitated by incorporating RRT
events into the handover processes and daily use of early warning
scores (EWS) in unit rounds.22,28
Inconsistent education
Low priority of education regarding the RRS and management of
deteriorating patients14,25,30 was a barrier while training was a
facilitator,25,27,36 with an emphasis on joint training sessions between
ward staff and the RRT35 and the use of simulation-based training.25
Training in the use of EWS as early as in university was described as a
facilitator.36 Physicians worrying the system could deskill junior
physicians was a barrier,33,37 while viewing RRT calls as learning
opportunities was a facilitator.37,38
Lack of equipment, personnel and integration with other hospital
systems
HCP described that the RRS increased workload,14,28,35,37,38 and
staff shortages were seen as a barrier.21,2729,31,38 An example was
too few RRT respondents: “ There is one [Registrar] in the whole
hospital and there could be six [rapid response] calls at once, and how
can they possibly get to six?” .29 Nurses described applying an
informal triage when wards were busy, allowing them to focus on
sicker patients and reduce monitoring of other patients.35 Not wanting
to disturb a busy ICU-nurse or physician,28,29 or knowing the ICU was
Table 2 – Included papers.
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full could prevent nurses from activating the RRT.30 HCP describe
lacking a system to determine how and when additional resources
could be provided.35 Other barriers were not having hospital-wide
systems for end-of-life-care decisions and planning,27,38 pain
management and palliative care services.38
Missing electronic tracking of vital signs and non-integration of
monitoring with other infrastructure was a barrier.27 As were poorly
designed documentation-charts, the simultaneous use of multiple
charts27,32 and different scoring-systems within one hospital.39
Unreliable, outdated, inefficient and poorly maintained equipment
hindered the RRS.21,27
The value of involvement and continuous follow-up
The involvement of HCP in continuous quality improvement was
described as a facilitator.25 The availability of training, followed up by
local audits and positive written responses were considered important
components to succeed with the RRS,29,34 as was a process for
immediately addressing problems, such as the intimidation of
nurses.25 By contrast, conflict was created by audits focusing solely
on nursing assignments and not on the behaviour of the responding
physician.34 EWS-audits lost their effect when staff did not receive
feedback.14
The afferent limb
The barrier of underestimating complexity
The missing link between measuring and interpreting vital signs
Due to high workload, vital-sign measurements were made by the
least-qualified; health-care assistants and students,14,21,34 leading to
an interval between the measurements and their interpretation.21,34
This was considered to increase the distance between nurses and
patients14,21,34 and to reduce vital-sign monitoring to a technical
task.14 Although technology was seen as a solution to facilitate
monitoring, the time spent “doing the vitals” was also seen as an
important opportunity to observe and interact with patients.35
Challenges in the use of observation and documentation systems
HCP perceived track and trigger charts20 and EWS22,39 as
valuable for increasing awareness about deteriorating patients,
assisting physicians in prioritizing care34,39 and to enhance
intraprofessional communication.22,36 Clearly defined documenta-
tion-charts and protocols made staff more confident about seeking
help.20,32,39Ward staff reported using a combination of the call-criteria
and their clinical judgement14,33,40: “ It should be an in-hand system,
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Table 3 – Categories and themes.
R E S U S C I T A T I O N 1 4 4 ( 2 0 1 9 ) 7 5 9 0 85
call the RRT based on clinical impression and concern29 or if they felt
the primary physician/on-call physician was not “doing their job”, was
inexperienced,40 or unavailable.29,33,37,40
The availability of real-time data via technological solutions
facilitated the RRS by allowing doctors to access patient’s vitals
from other sites. However, this technology could be a barrier if
access was cumbersome in emergency situations; e.g. having to
log on to a computer.39 Delays of vital-signs entry into the
electronic health records could delay the detection of clinical
deterioration.31
Barriers were described in HCPs use of documentation
systems,22,27,28,32 for example: charts had incomplete dataset and
incorrectly calculated EWS,14,22 deliberately not documenting vitals in
the electronic management system when wards were busy, seeing
this as only a bureaucratic task35 and documenting altered call-criteria
for patients on loose notes.28 The introduction of a chart with ranges
rather than exact numbers resulted in double documentation or nurses
having to estimate numbers when speaking with physicians32 posing
as barrier.
The customization by physicians of call-criteria for individual
patients, was viewed as both a facilitator and a barrier.19,22,28,32 One
publication described how this practice had resulted in both
inappropriate changes to avoid alarms and reluctance to change
criteria resulting in unnecessary activation.28
The value of knowing the patient
Continuity of care and knowing the patient were perceived as
important for the detection of subtle changes.20 Nurses valued clinical
intuition to monitor patients and take extra vital-signs when
concerned, but resented being instructed to do so, without a good
reason, by junior physicians.35 Not having time to “ lay eyes on the
patient” was perceived as a barrier.31 HCP worried focusing on EWS
might mean overlooking cues such as blood results and overall clinical
assessment22,39 and decline in patient assessment skills.19,32 HCP
reported that in daytime, they preferred to call the primary team rather
than the RRT because of their familiarity with the patient’s condition.40
The complex inter-professional “knotworking” process
HCP believing that the RRT brought expertise and could expedite
transfer of patients to higher-level care and improved patient
outcomes30 facilitated the RRS. However, the nature of the
detection/decision-making process differed between nurses (hierar-
chical and protocol-based) and physicians (autonomous).19,27,33,34
The process of deciding whether to activate the RRT, were
described by Kitto et al.33 as “knotworking”; nurses and physicians
constantly collaborated vertically (with senior colleagues) and
horizontally (between nurse and physician) to identify the appropriate
place for the RRT. Physician autonomy could be a barrier to this
process,19,28,32,34 but when nurses could obtain help without seeking
permission, the RRS was described as empowering.29,37
HCP described that calling the RRT could be a way of realigning
the workload to ensure that other patients were not neglected.29,35,37
Nurses reported that knowing they could get help from colleagues to
care for other patients while attending a RRS event, was an important
facilitator.29,30
The severity of clinical change
The perceived severity of a patients clinical condition influenced
the likelihood of a RRT activation, with high EWS35 or abrupt/serious
changes being an acceptable trigger for RRT calls.31,40 Physicians
described the RRT as “ . . . the go-to team to provide urgent diagnosis
and periarrest resuscitation . . . ” Being able to call the RRT when
concerned was described as an important facilitator,22,36 but subtle
clinical changes often required navigation around system
obstacles.14,31,34,40 Nurses described being afraid the patient was
not sick enough to require the call26,30; often waiting for “it to get
worse”, searching for support to validate clinical decisions22,26,30,31 or
using closer monitoring to find an objective trigger to justify a call.14,31
In these situations, HCP highlighted the importance of communica-
tion, and the ability to articulate the exact patient problem clearly.40
RRS protocol vs. reality
Confusion and lack of clarity around protocols,27,31,32 which
introduced variations in response behaviour,39 was reported as a
barrier. Despite having a track and trigger system, escalation often
went through the hierarchy of the system.21,40
Perceptions of the call-criteria influenced their useful-
ness.14,19,26,28,3032,35 Perceiving them as too sensitive35 or non-
specific22,31 created alarm fatigue.19,28,32 Nurses believing they could
handle the situation themselves,30,31,35 HCP finding EWS and their
own clinical judgement conflicting14,22 and disagreeing with the set
parameters26 were barriers. One publication described how it was
Table 4 – Summary table of key findings.
RRS limb Facilitators Barriers
Administrative and quality
improvement limbs
Leadership support Poor governance
Shared mission Lack of commitment
Involvement of healthcare professionals Unclear protocols
Continuous quality improvement Lack of staff
Interprofessional training Lack of equipment
Poorly designed and integrated monitoring- and documentation systems
Afferent Knowing the patient High workload
Clearly defined protocols Disconnection between vital-sign measurements and interpretation
Empowered nurses and physicians The existing hierarchy
Challenges in use of monitoring- and documentation systems
The connection between the
afferent and efferent limb
Expertise Reprimanding down the hierarchy
Patient centered teamwork Waiting for the patient to get worse
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regarded as acceptable for nurses to falsify observations if they felt the
patient was okay, to avoid having to explain why they did not react to
an abnormal parameter.32 Omission of monitoring at night because of
nurses concern about sleep deprivation was also reported.35
The connection of the afferent and efferent limb
The barriers in lack of trust and respectful behaviour
The lack of interprofessional trust and challenges of collaboration
Multiple papers reported that ward physicians or RRT members
reprimanded, criticized or had a negative attitude toward a nurse who
called the RRT.19,2527,2931,33,35,37,40 Nurses’ believed that this
behaviour might be caused by ward physicians feeling of failure if the
nurse called the RRT directly: «going over the head of the
physician” .25,29,31,37 This, provoked by physicians fear of being seen
as clinically inept28,40 or being ashamed to ask for help.35
Junior physicians described fearing criticism by senior staff for
activating the RRT,27,28,34,40 and had learned they should manage on
their own.34,40Ward nurses were also concerned about being seen as
incompetent by the RRT.26,2931 Perceiving RRT-calls as a failure
disrupted the collaboration with the RRT.25
Ward nurses valued the RRT-nurse, regardless of “ their place in
the RRT” .29 Having a dedicated full-time RRT-nurse working next to
the ward nurses25 or doing rounds on units,31 were described as
facilitators. Nurses also reported a lower threshold for calling a nurse-
led RRT, than a physician-led RRT.36 One study reported that a nurse-
led RRT supported junior medical staff and facilitated communication
with more senior staff,39 but another reported that physicians found
nurse-led RRT difficult to accept.38 RRT-members acting as mentors
for ward nurses30 and providing education for all ward staff34,37,38
facilitated the RRS.
Nurses were more inclined to reach out to physicians with
whom they had a good relationship, and considered to be skilled.35
RRT-calls were facilitated by supportive, professional and caring
RRT-members,30,35,36 who confirmed the nurses’ findings, and
gave positive feedback.29,36 Conversely, differing task priorities
between the RRT and the ward nurses were described as
barriers.38
Familiarity within the RRT and between RRT-members and
ward staff was reported to enhance teamwork, especially under
time-pressure.25 However, rotation and varied positions of ward
physicians made it difficult for the RRT to establish effective
relationships.38
Douglas et al.19 stated that the effectiveness of an RRT was
“ depending entirely on the people within the team on that particular
day” . A key factor in the effectiveness of the efferent limb, was
reported to be the clinical expertise and crisis management
skills. An RRT leader that managed to be “ an information
gatherer and willing to have a dialogue” , facilitated the function of
the RRT.25 By contrast, a lack of clear leadership could result in
chaos.26
When junior doctors were the first tier of response, they reported
feeling out of depth and anxious,28 and nurses rarely found their
contributions helpful.35 The RRS effectiveness was further
compromised if the junior doctors only reluctantly alerted the next
tier (more senior specialist).28
Not knowing the patient
It was considered a barrier to the efferent limb that the RRT lacked
detailed knowledge of the patient’s medical history.28,37,40
Discussion
In this systematic review, we explored facilitators and barriers within
the limbs of the RRS as reported by HCP working within the system.
Major findings
A major barrier to succeed with a RRS seems to be the disconnection
of the administrative and quality improvement limbs from the
operational afferent and efferent limbs. The operational limbs often
seem to be left operating on their own, dealing with inadequate
monitoring and documentation systems,14,21,22,27,28,31,32,39 under-
staffing21,2729,31,38 inconsistent RRS education14,25,30 and unclear
protocols.27,31,32
Our analysis further presents the complexity of operating within
and between the operational limbs. HCPs interpretation of and
confidence in the call-criteria14,19,22,28,3032 and alarm fatigue19,28,32
are barriers to be taken seriously. Interestingly, the possibility of
customizing the call-criteria for an individual patient was described as
both a facilitator and a barrier, perhaps underlining the complexity
of this process.19,22,28,32 Our findings imply that it is important to
incorporate clinical judgement as a valid call-criterion for both nurses
and doctors.14,19,22,28
Lack of inter-professional trust may be one of the core barrier for
succeeding with a RRS. HCP rapport being criticized and
reprimanded when trying to follow the patient-centered intention of
the RRS.19,2531,33,34,37 The conflicts between nurses and ward
physicians regarding alerting the RRT seem to be enhanced in
protocols where RRT is expected to be alerted directly, bypassing the
ward physician.25,29,31,37 Involvement of the ward physician in RRT
calls might reduce conflict and facilitate RRT activation. It might also
counteract the barrier of physicians fearing that the RRT will interfere
with treatment despite being unfamiliar with the patient`s medical
history.28,37,40
The RRT structure in the reviewed papers varies greatly (Table 4).
This review highlights the importance of the members` clinical
expertise and ability to work together for the patient25,28 and a
belief in inter-professional training and education to improve
collaboration.25,36
Comparison with previous studies
Incomplete implementation and sustainability of RRS remains a
major issue.13,41 In this review the barriers for activation of the
efferent limb were frequent and in line with the finding described by
Chua et al.42 By using the RRS model (Fig. 1) in the analysing
process, we found that root causes for major barriers and
facilitators for RRS may lie within the administrative and quality
improvement limbs. The importance of leadership, for successful
system-wide implementation implies the involvement and align-
ment of leaders on all levels.43,44 Disconnected leadership has
been identified be a significant factor in health-care organizations
struggling to improve quality.45 Jones et al.46 emphasised that an
RRS needs to be part of the hospitals overall plan. A variety of
approaches is available to assist the process of achieving
successful implementation.47,48 Successful systems engage in
quality improvement which require commitment, focus on goals as
well as on process, using data measurement and feedback.2
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Regarding activation of the RRT, alarm fatigue is a known
barrier.41 Douglas et al.19 found that increased familiarity, agreement,
and perceived benefit of activation-criteria increases the frequency of
RRT activation. The ongoing development of a validated scoring
system such as National Early Warning Score (NEWS),49 might help
to overcome these barriers. The value of involving the primary team in
RRT-calls50,51 has also been demonstrated.
Previous research has highlighted inter-professional simulation-
based training as a tool to improve both technical and non-technical
skills.52 Increased use of this approach might enhance the
effectiveness of RRT in caring for deteriorating patients and breaking
down silos between RRT and ward personnel.
By increasing the confidence and knowledge of nursing staff, training
improves theirability to detect and handle clinical deterioration.53Wehbe-
Janek et al.54 suggested that a simulation-based training program could
overcome system barriers and augment the use of RRT. Theilen et al.55
demonstrated that regular in-situ simulation training of a paediatric RRT
led to sustained improvement.
A RRS is a hospital-wide intervention with many interdependent
parts and requires a complex chain of events to occur in a timely
progression.
The health-care system is rapidly developing, continuously
educating and employing new staff, integrating new technology and
providing advanced care for patients with complex conditions. It is
important to be aware that “Any change in a work system element
interact and produces changes elsewhere in the work system”.56
Technological solutions to patient monitoring that alert staff and RRS-
personnel of deteriorating patients,5760 could facilitate afferent limb,
but their integration should be carefully tested in clinical practice.
We believe in increased involvement of HCP in the continuous
follow-up on results and the process within and between the limbs of
RRS. We suggest focus on inter-professional simulation-based
training to improve communication and collaboration.
Areas for future research
To find the keys to succeed with a RRS, research should study the
barriers and facilitators within the administrative and quality
improvement limbs, as they should have the power and budget to
provide a solid foundation for the operational limbs.
Continuously connected and involved administrative and quality-
improvement limbs are essential to ensure the effectiveness of the
operational limbs.14,25,26 This work cannot be completed by a set date;
it is a never-ending process.
Strengths and limitations
The strengths of this systematic review are its presentation of the
perspectives of the HCP operating the RRS. It includes papers from
10 different nations, more than 20 hospital-systems and different
professions, levels of experience and RRS structures, thus providing a
broad picture of facilitators of and barriers to current RRS. Although
there is great variation between health-care systems, we identified
several common facilitators and barriers, which increases the
transferability of the analysis.
Although the literature search aimed to be broad, the choice of
search terms might have failed to identify papers with important
additional insights. Because the studies included in the review were
interview-based, sampled purposively or by convenience and always
voluntary, inclusion bias may be an issue. As evident from the critical
appraisal (Table 2), most researchers do not adequately consider
their relationship with the participants. This is a weakness, because
the results of interviews are influenced by the moderator. Ethical
considerations were handled differently in the studies, reflecting
different countries and regions with different rules and regulations.
Conclusion
In this systematic review, we explored facilitators and barriers, as
described by HCP, within all limbs of the RRS and their interconnec-
tions. The keys to succeed with RRS seem to lie in the administrative
and quality improvement limbs. Clear leadership, the availability of
consistent education and training, equipment, personnel and clear
protocols were essential for the operational limbs. Further, we found
that continuous work to mitigate barriers and improve the system was of
key importance. We suggest increased use of interprofessional
simulation-based training to increase technical and non- technical
skills, establish inter-professional trust and build support for the RRS.
Hospital environments change continuously with the employment of
new staff, integration of new technology, and provision of more
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